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Hamas Terror on Israel

M. Israeli counter-offensive

General Information

Section titled “General Information”

  1. Having examined the evidence of the events of 7 October, the Commission finds that Israeli Security Forces’ response to the attack was significantly delayed and, in many places, inadequate. Small teams of Israeli ground forces appeared in several locations during the morning hours but they were slow to arrive, insufficient in numbers and lacked coordination with central command and with each other.1 Several tanks were also active that day, both at border locations and in the civilian villages. In many kibbutzim, local rapid deployment security teams fought against the attackers, saving many lives, with very little or no external reinforcement.2 In the Nova festival site, local police assigned to secure the festival conducted much of the fighting against militants, aided by intermittent independently-deployed Israeli Security Forces until the early afternoon when more reinforcements arrived. Although the situation differed between the various locations, in general the Commission observes that in most locations more significant and organized Israeli Security Forces only arrived in the early afternoon.3

  2. The Commission found that Israeli Security Forces based in outposts around Otef Aza were forced to defend their positions and engage in battles in the military bases which were also attacked and were not able to deploy to the civilian villages to provide assistance. In some cases, the absence of deployment to the civilian villages was due to lack of knowledge of the various attack sites given the poor communications and, due to this lack of communications, a belief of each Army team that they were the only ones under attack. One commander, a major in Israeli Security Forces’ 77th Armoured Corps Battalion, spoke about the Armoured Corps’ situation that day: “Each individual tank does not understand that there is a situation in the whole area. It also does not understand why nobody is coming to help and there is no liaising factor that says go here or go there. There is anarchy.” He also summarized his perception of Israeli Security Forces’ failure that day, saying “At the end of the day, kibbutz Be’eri, kibbutz Nahal Oz, the party [Nova festival], all these kibbutzim were in our area. And with all the heroics we hear about, a lot of these stories occurred within the bases. Our raison d’etre for being there was not to defend ourselves! [it was to defend the civilians]. Unfortunately, that morning we did not have this picture to even start trying to take these decisions.”

  3. The Commission observes that Israeli Security Forces failed to understand the magnitude of the attack and were unprepared to respond to an attack on the scale of 7 October. They were overwhelmed by the large number of locations of simultaneous attacks on bases, kibbutzim and towns in the area, lack ed effective communication between forces on the ground and higher command, and failed to understand the full tactical situation on the ground, due to the militants rendering surveillance equipment ineffective earlier in the day.

  4. In relation to ground forces, the Commission documented several accounts of individual members of Israeli Security Forces who decided, largely on their own accord, to deploy to the Otef Aza area and to help with the counter-offensive. Others consulted with Israeli Security Forces members of various ranks prior to deployment. Many of these self-deployed Israeli Security Forces members lived in locations in or near Otef Aza. In some instances, armed Israeli civilians decided to join the battles independently. These deployments appeared to be disorganized, with Israeli Security Forces members picking up other soldiers on the way and diverting to other locations without clear orders from the military leadership. In one case, the head of the Givati Brigade, who lives in the village of Meitar, some 45 minutes’ drive from the Gaza border area, stated in a media interview that he had heard the sirens and explosions and called the Israeli Security Forces Southern Command who told him to go to Sderot. On his way to Sderot he picked up some soldiers who were stationed nearby. While in Sderot, he received a call from another Israeli Security Forces member who told him to leave Sderot and go to Kfar Aza and Nahal Oz. He took a quick decision to go to Kfar Aza, while calling on other Givati forces to join from various locations in Israel. In another case, the head of an Israeli Security Forces reserve unit (Gdud 71), Leutenant Colonel Meir Carmi, informally conscripted his unit and called it into battle without receiving a deployment or conscription instruction for the unit.

  5. In locations where Israeli Security Forces ground forces were present in the early morning hours, most on self-deployment, there was mass confusion, including around coordination with local rapid response units, identification of militants, and insufficient forces to push back attackers. Soldiers reported feeling helpless, not knowing when reinforcements would arrive. A police officer fighting in Kfar Aza filmed frantic scenes through his body-camera, showing calls for additional forces to deploy,calls for medical assistance, and his confusion over how to identify militants when some were dressed in civilian clothes and roaming around the kibbutz freely.

  6. In relation to the Israeli Security Forces Armored Corps, reports indicate that some 23 tanks were stationed throughout the whole border area with Gaza, many of them unmanned. The southern reach of the Gaza Battalion had six manned tanks covering 35 km of the border. According to the testimony of a tank crew based in the Mars outpost, at 06:30 on 7 October, crew members were woken by the rockets and decided to drive their tank west towards the border. While they were driving, they received an order from Colonel Assaf Hamami, Commander of the 7th Brigade, to move through the fields towards kibbutz Nirim and defend the kibbutz. On the way to Nirim they noticed militants and engaged in battle. In Nirim the tank crew received reports of 22 different breaches of the border and 10 different fighting locations, all in the southern reach. They drove towards military identification point 179, close to kibbutz Nir Oz, where a burnt- out tank was standing with nobody inside. The crew thought that Israeli Security Forces had been abducted. In the same area of point 179 they noticed hundreds of people crossing into Israel and back to Gaza and they shot at them, including at vehicles laden with people, some of whom may have been hostages.4

  7. Several other tank teams joined the battles from a base further south in Nitzana, where tanks were stationed to secure the border between Israel and Egypt. At least three tanks came from Nitzana. One tank was positioned at the fence near Kissufim, another went to kibbutz Holit to fend off militants and the third joined the battle at the Sufa outpost.

  8. In relation to the Israeli Air Force, the Commission confirmed that at least eight Apache helicopters were dispatched to the area around the Gaza border on 7 October, observing the situation on road 232, attacking militants and others crossing over from Gaza through the breaches in the fence, providing air support to forces battling in the Nahal Oz outpost and reportedly shooting at targets in kibbutz Kerem Shalom. Video statements by Apache helicopter pilots, included in an Israeli news segment, assert that two Apache helicopters, from Squadron 113, were in the air and carrying out attacks on Israeli soil from the early hours of 7 October. At 06:50, the two helicopter crews, who were on alert at the base, were sent to their helicopters. At 07:00 they were already on their way to the Gaza border area. One of the helicopters was deployed towards Zikim, instructed to assist the Navy to thwart the entry of a boat onto Israeli shores. At 07:35, two additional attack helicopters arrived from a base in the north of the country and were sent to the area of the Nahal Oz base.

  9. The Israeli Air Force also faced challenges in distinguishing civilians from combatants. One of the pilots stated in an interview “I understand that I will have a dilemma who are our forces and who are enemy forces if at all, and who are civilians”. Another pilot, Lieutenant Colonel A [names redacted at source], stated that he then started firing at people crossing over the fence into Israel. A third pilot, Lieutenant Colonel E, commander of Squadron 113, stated that he arrived at around 07:50 and saw a lot of bonfires and small arms fire and he focused on a group of perceived militants approaching one of the military outposts. Helicop ters also directed fire on the breaches in the fence where they shot at people and vehicles entering Israel.

  10. By 10:00 there were reportedly eight attack helicopters in the air. One of the pilots stated that at some point they realised that Israelis were being abducted and taken back to Gaza. He said, “I allow myself to say that I already understand how targets operate. An abducted person will not run in the middle of a group of people without anyone holding him. I choose targets that I say to myself that the chance that I am also shooting at abductees is low… but it is not 100 percent.” 210. In addition to the Apache helicopters, at least one Israeli Air Force Yas’ur5 helicopter was in the air. The helicopter was shot down by militants in the late morning near kibbutz Be’eri while deploying troops. According to reports and footage viewed by the Commission, all troops in the helicopter managed to es cape.

  11. Six Israeli police helicopters were also in the air that day and faced challenges in coordinating their operations with the Israeli Air Force. The Commission viewed footage and conversations between police helicopter pilots and Israeli Air Force contained in an Israeli tv news segment, with the latter instructing the police not to deploy to active battle scenes without the accompaniment of an Israeli Air Force attack helicopter. A police helicopter pilot is heard saying in response: “Roger. Sometimes we have to take risks. We know there is an incident of a force in danger in Sderot. The idea is to give them eyes, to understand who is against who. To build a picture there.” The pilot tries again “we will be happy to deploy for 15 minutes, to give them a picture, there is a massacre there, friends”. Yet the Israeli Air Force persisted in its restrictions, noting that they fear that militants will use anti-aircraft missiles against the unarmed helicopters. The police helicopter pilot then decided to ignore the Israeli Air Force instructions and deploy to Sderot where it hovered over the police station, providing information to the police forces fighting inside and requesting Israeli Air Force attack helicopter assistance. The remaining five police helicopters then deployed for liaison, communication and deconfliction between Israeli Security Forces, Israeli Air Force and police on the ground throughout the day.

Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive in kibbutz Be’eri

Section titled “Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive in kibbutz Be’eri”

  1. The 10 members of the kibbutz’s rapid response team were the first line of defence for Be’eri residents. By 07:30, two members of the response team had been killed and another three wounded. The wounded were taken to the dental clinic, where the remaining medical staff were hiding. Once inside, the clinic was barricaded and defended by the remaining members of the response team. At 13:50, the rapid response team, still defending the dental clinic, ran out of ammunition and the attackers broke into the building. According to a recorded call by a paramedic, Amit Man, who was treating the wounded in the clinic, at 14:15 militants shot her in the legs and killed most others in the building. Despite wearing a medic uniform, Amit Man was also killed by the attackers. The only survivors at the clinic were another nurse, who was hiding in the clinic’s bathroom, and one member of the response team, who was taken for dead by the attackers. They were evacuated from the clinic by Israeli Security Forces sometime between 16:00 and 18:30 on 7 October.

  2. The first external response force, comprising five counter-terrorism unit (Yamam) officers, approached the entrance of the kibbutz as early as 07:37, where they joined some members of the rapid response team. Overwhelmed by the militants and suffering losses, they retreated an hour later. At 09:00, a 14-member team of Israeli Air Force Unit 5101 (Shaldag) was airlifted by helicopter close to the kibbutz. The team positioned itself at the entrance, trying to block the arrival of more militants, resulting in some clashes. After several hours, however, the unit was outnumbered and it too was forced to retreat.

  3. At 13:00, the Shaldag unit returned to the kibbutz reinforced by the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal). Only at around 14:30, some seven hours after the start of the attack, Israeli Security Forces started to recapture the communal and residential buildings of the kibbutz. However, due to the relatively small number of forces, the advance was slow. At 16:00, additional Israeli Security Forces ground troops, with armored corps soldiers manning two tanks, were deployed to the site and, sometime after 16:00, began regaining control and started evacuating residents.

  4. According to witness testimonies, even after being deployed to the kibbutz vicinity, Israeli Security Forces failed to dispatch all available forces into the kibbutz to fend off the attack and assist the civilian population. Video footage retrieved from a police helicopter indicates that at 16:23 a large Israeli Security Forces convoy gathered in front of the yellow gate of the kibbutz but did not move inside. Large numbers of Israeli Security Forces soldiers were seen still waiting outside the kibbutz gate as of 18:10, according to the testimony of a member of the kibbutz rapid response team who observed, “Five hundred IDF soldiers were outside, organized, with dogs, with equipment, weapons, and armored vehicles; they were standing outside and not a single one of them is doing anything … They kept repeating, ‘The field isn’t sterile, the field isn’t sterile’.” This testimony was confirmed by other survivors, who witnessed Israeli troops at the entrance of the kibbutz at this time. At 22:00 on 8 October, Israeli Security Forces announced that it was in control of the kibbutz while the full elimination of all militants was reported in the afternoon of 9 October.

Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive in kibbutz Nir Oz

Section titled “Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive in kibbutz Nir Oz”

  1. Israeli Security Forces provided no external assistance to kibbutz Nir Oz during the 7 October attack, leaving the local rapid response team to fend for itself. According to reports, the kibbutz’s rapid response team did not have sufficient ammunition and many of the team did not manage to reach the armoury to get their weapons and so were essentially unarmed. At least one member of the rapid response team was killed during the attack and the commander of the team was injured. At 13:50, the first Israeli Security Forces started arriving at the kibbutz, including fighters from marine commando Shayetet 13 unit who arrived by helicopter at 14:40. Despite the forces’ arrival and the departure of militants back to Gaza, messages continued to be sent on the kibbutz chat groups with requests for help until 17:30.

  2. It appears that kibbutz Nir Oz suffered in particular from the vacuum of information inside the Israeli Security Forces (see para 201 above) which resulted in no reinforcements sent. An investigation by Haaretz claimed that, even when Israeli Security Forces command knew about the situation in the villages, they prioritized the protection of military assets that day. Moreover, those few Israeli Security Forces teams that were deployed that day to the area – before more reinforcements arrived – were sent to Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz, Be’eri, Kissufim, Nirim, Nir Itzhak, Holit and Kerem Shalom. None were sent to Nir Oz until after the militants had left.6

Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive in the Nova festival site

Section titled “Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive in the Nova festival site”

  1. At around 12:30, the first Israeli Security Forces reinforcements began to arrive at the Nova site, joining the remaining police who had been assigned to work at the festival, some limited police reinforcements who had arrived throughout the morning and several soldiers from the army who arrived independently at the scene.7 Two of the soldiers were a Brigadier General (reserve) and his son, an officer in the Gaza Battalion. The two were living in one of the kibbutzim in the area and had been trying to reach the Gaza Battalion base in Re’im when they stopped to assist fleeing festival-goers at the intersection between the Nova festival and road 232. According to a video testimony, they were armed with handguns only and were positioned for a while among the cars at the traffic jam at the exit into road 232. The two, who had seen militants on the way from their home, tried to warn festival-goers to flee through the field east of the site. At the junction they joined several police officers who were working at the festival and the group tried to hold their position against approaching militants. They eventually entered a car driven by one of the policemen, drove south on road 232 and stopped after a few hundred meters at a parked tank on the side of the road, and joined a group of police who formed a defensive position behind the tank where tens of festival-goers were hiding.

  2. The Commission confirmed the presence of this tank at the Nova festival site, through multiple testimonies and visual evidence, which protected some 30 fleeing festival-goers. According to the tank driver’s testimony given to Israeli media, the tank was part of the 77 th battalion of the Armored Corps that had been stationed close to the perimeter fence and had participated in initial battles against approaching militants earlier that morning. The tank driver reported that his crew had killed 15 militants before being shot at with an anti-tank missile, after which he drove the tank away from the scene to escape additional hits. At around 08:20, the tank reached the area of Re’im where he noticed many parked cars. He was not aware of the festival taking place in this location, He saw a battle underway between approximately 10 police officers and 50 militants. The tank’s cannon was not working at this point, so he decided to position the tank between the police and the militants to block off the militants’ access. At 08:30 the position was largely overrun and militants started climbing on the tank. The tank driver drove off as grenades were thrown into the tank, running over militants in his wake, eventually coming to a stop on a clearing some 500 meters south of the intersection. He then escaped from the tank, suffering from injuries, and hid in a nearby location. Additional video footage recovered from that day and viewed by the Commission confirms these details. In a video viewed by the Commission, a tank is seen driving alongside abandoned vehicles, running over some of them, at the intersection between the Nova festival exit and road 232, heading south.

  3. At around 10:00, people fleeing the festival started congregating behind the tank. Two surviving festival-goers stated in a media interview that, upon noticing the tank, they entered it to look for ammunition or weapons. They reported that the tank was abandoned and contained the bodies of soldiers. The Brigadier General (reserve) mentioned above, reportedly managed the defence of the position.8 The group found one machine gun in the tank and used it to defend the position over the next several hours, with some 30 fleeing festival-goers taking cover behind the tank. According to his statement, he informed the Gaza Battalion of his position and requested the deployment of an attack helicopter to assist in the battle. He stated that a helicopter was sent to their position but could not fire since the pilot could not distinguish between civilians and militants. However, according to him, the presence of the helicopter in the air served as a deterrence to militants who r educed the intensity of their attack.

  4. Footage viewed by the Commission from the area around the tank shows some 30 people hiding behind the tank which is flanked by a parked white van on one side and a black vehicle on the other. Several of those who are h iding are lying on the ground and some appear to be wounded. Two men are seen wearing combat helmets and civilian clothes; these are likely the two men noted above who found the helmets inside the tank. The group includes two armed policemen visible in the footage. One man in a blue uniform is seen speaking on the phone in the footage and is likely the Brigadier General. Two of those who took cover behind the tank were Palestinian citizens of Israel who had been working at the Nova festival. They stated in an interview that they dug a ditch under the tank in order to hide. They hid in that location with other injured people, including one person who was injured from an RPG fired towards the tank. According to surviving witnesses, everyone who hid behind the tank survived.

Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive at Zikim beach

Section titled “Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive at Zikim beach”
  1. In Zikim Beach, Israeli Security Forces learned of the impending attack after several Hamas boats had already left Gaza and were noticed by the Navy lookout officers. The security coordinator of kibbutz Zikim reported that at 6:34 he had received a call that the Israeli Navy had declared a “parash” situation [Israeli Security Forces code for infiltration], reporting that seven boats had left Gaza and four boats were approaching Zikim beach. The security coordinator reported understanding that two of the boats were heading to Masa Erez military base while two others were heading to Ashkelon. Reportedly, four of the seven boats were intercepted by the Navy at sea, one of which went up in flames. The Commission viewed video footage of the Navy’s counter-offensive and confirms that, while one rubber boat was burning, some distance away, soldiers upon a Navy boat were shooting and throwing grenades at militants who were in the water. The Navy boat in the video is seen approaching the Zikim power station from the south. The Commission assesses that the Navy was chasing boats that were trying to aim for Ashkelon. Video footage from the beach security camera shows that two boats made landfall on Zikim beach some 50 meters apart. Five Hamas militants emerged from the first boat at 06:45, running towards the beach and shooting, while shortly after four Hamas militants emerged from the second boat and headed for the beach.

Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive and the application of the ‘Hannibal Directive’9

Section titled “Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive and the application of the ‘Hannibal Directive’9”

  1. The Commission documented strong indications that the ‘Hannibal Directive’ was used in several instances on 7 October, harming Israelis at the same time as striking Palestinian militants.

  2. In relation to the Nova site, several reports claimed that Israeli helicopters were present at the Nova site and may have shot at targets on the ground, including civilian vehicles. The Commission verified the presence of at least eight attack helicopters in the area of Otef Aza at various times on 7 October,10 with one or two helicopters present over the Nova festival site in the mid -morning hours. This is based on the testimony of a Palestinian citizen of Israel who was working at the Nova festival who stated in an interview that, shortly after militants arrived in the Nova site, he saw a helicopter hovering over the site. Additionaly, an Israeli Secruity Forces reserve Brigadier General, who fought against militants near a parked tank close to the Nova site, stated that he called the Gaza Battalion to request an attack helicopter and that one was deployed, although it served for deterrence purposes only.11

  3. A report in Israeli publication Haaretz claimed that, after the attack, Israeli Security Forces southern command identified 77 car wrecks which had been shot by Israeli tanks, helicopters or drones. A similar allegation was made in an investigative report by an Israeli news publication, stating that, once the first indications of a mass abduction incident were received by Israeli Security Forces, at around noon on 7 October, a Hannibal Directive was issued directing pilots and other Israeli Security Forces personnel to target all vehicles returning to Gaza that day. Although the Commission confirmed the presence of helicopters in the area, it was unable to confirm whether these helicopters directed firepower at any actual targets in the Nova area, vehicles or otherwise.

  4. A video statement by an Israeli Security Forces tank driver, viewed by the Commission, confirms that at least one individual tank team knowingly applied the ‘Hannibal Directive’ that day. In a statement given to an Israeli news channel, a tank driver and commander stated that they targeted two Toyota vehicles with militants and Israelis. This occurred at point 179, close to kibbutz Nir Oz. They noted that there were many people standing in the back of the pickup trucks and what appeared to be a “pile of other people” next to them. The tank team could not confirm whether the people they saw were alive or dead at the time. They shot towards the two vehicles and assessed that they hit the first vehicle and may have missed the second one. Asked why he decided to shoot at the vehicles, the commander said “something in my gut feeling made me think that they [his soldiers] could be on them [on the vehicles]. Yes, I could have killed them, but I decided that this is the right decision. I prefer stopping the abduction so they won’t be taken.” The tank commander also clarified that the Hannibal Directive involves several stages: “when you implement the order itself, there are several gradual things you need to do. You need to direct fire to ‘blocking locations’ and ‘control points’, and, when you have recognition, you have to also do that thing [referring to the Hanibal Directive]”. He concluded by saying that to his knowledge he did not kill any soldiers.

  5. The Commission verified information indicating that, in at least two other cases, Israeli Security Forces counter-offensive actions resulted in harm to and the killing of Israeli civilians and, in one of the cases, the actions were undertaken with clear knowledge of this risk. According to the Commission’s investigation, in these two cases at least 14 Israeli civilians were likely killed as a result of Israeli Security Forces fire: one woman was killed by helicopter fire while being taken from kibbutz Nir Oz to Gaza by militants12 and the other 13 were likely killed by tank shelling and crossfire in kibbutz Be’eri.13

  6. In relation to the killing of Israeli hostages in kibbutz Be’eri, according to the Commission’s investigation, at 12:56 approximately 40 Hamas militants and members of other armed groups broke into the house of Be’eri resident Pessi Cohen, killing one civilian hiding in the house and wounding one other. The attackers then brought to the house several other civilians who had been abducted from other houses in the kibbutz, and the militants gathered them in the dining room. At this point there were 15 civilians in the house, including two 12-year-old children. According to survivors’ testimonies, the militants also brought a Palestinian man from East Jerusalem who had been abducted from the Nova festival to act as an interpreter. At approximately 15:00 the militants’ commander, Hasan Hamduna, asked one of the hostages, a woman who had fled the Nova festival and sought refuge in Be’eri, to call the Yamam unit of the police and negotiate a safe passage to Gaza together with the hostages. Reportedly, Hamduna stated his affiliation with the al-Qassam Brigades in the call with the Yaman. Hamduna demanded safe passage for himself and the abductees to Gaza or he would kill the hostages.

  7. At approximately 16:00, the first large Israeli Security Forces force, led by the commander of the 99th Infantry Division Brigadier, General Barak Hiram, arrived at the site alongside Yamam forces. According to the testimony of a surviving hostage, while seven of the hostages were still outside the house in the yard, Yamam forces started firing at the members of the armed groups, resulting in a firefight, with hostages in the yard being trapped in the middle.After around 30 minutes, at approximately 16:30, Hamduna, who was still talking on the phone with Yamam, announced that he wanted to surrender. Instructed by the police to undress, Hamduna undressed and stepped out of the house with the female hostage using her as a human shield. At 17:30 Hamduna and the hostage reached the Israeli Security Forces. After safely reaching the police, Hamduna was detained and the survivor was interrogated and shared information about the 14 hostages still being held in the house and the 40 militants still inside. According to the survivor’s testimony, while she was being interrogated, the firefight with small arms fire and RPGs between the Israeli Security Forces and militants continued. According to reports, Hamduna agreed to call out to the remaining militants in the house with a loudspeaker and tell them to surrender. Yet, the exchange of fire continued for another hour, resulting in the death of at least two hostages in the house yard.

  8. At approximately 17:30, the barricaded militants fired an RPG rocket at the Israeli Security Forces. According to the survivor’s testimony, at around 19:00, Brigadier General Barak Hiram gave an order to fire tank shells at the house, “even at the cost of civilian casualties”, he was quoted as saying in a later media interview. According to video footage retrieved from a police helicopter, and the survivor’s testimony, an Israeli Security Forces tank fired two shells in the direction of the house. After the tank finished shooting, the survivor reported hearing Israeli Security Forces saying: “there is an injured hostage”, and retrieved another woman from the house. The second survivor who survived the shelling told media sources that her husband had died as a result of the shelling, while she was injured by the shrapnel. Thirteen people were killed in this incident, including two 12-year-old twins, Liel and Yanai Hezroni, and their aunt, Ayala Hezroni. The Commission notes that at least some of the hostages were killed by crossfire while they were in the garden.

  9. An investigation by an Israeli news site, published in April 2024, refuted some of these details and claimed that a total of three shells were fired at the house that day: two initial shells were fired earlier in the afternoon and were intended as warning shells aimed at targets adjacent to the house. These shells did not cause significant damage to the structure or to the people inside it. According to the investigation, only at around 19:00 Israeli Security Forces led by Yamam considered a strike that would “aim to end the situation”. A decision was then made to shell the roof of the house. Following the shelling, Yamam forces entered the home, took note that some people were still alive, including militants, and saw a woman who had survived. They removed her from the house as it went up in flames.

  10. The Commission also verified information indicating that at least one re sident of kibbutz Nir Oz was killed as a result of Israeli Air Force helicopter fire as she was being abducted into Gaza. Efrat Katz, aged 68, was abducted by militants along with her daughter and two grandaughters, as well as other kibbutz residents. Efrat and the other abductees were placed in the cart of a tractor and driven in the direction of Gaza. According to her daughter’s testimony to Israeli media, on the way to Gaza an exchange of fire erupted between the militants and Israeli Security Forces, who were trying to stop them. As a result of the shooting, Efrat Katz was killed, while her daughter was wounded in her back and one of her daughters was wounded on her leg.

  11. A released hostage from kibbutz Nir Oz was also in the cart of the tractor and witnessed the events unfolding. She stated that at approximately 11:30 the tractor reached some 150 meters before the border. She then heard the sounds of a helicopter in the air and of shooting. She realized that she had been hit by the gunfire and that Efrat had been hit too. She confirmed that Efrat died on the spot as a result of the helicopter fire.

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Footnotes

Section titled “Footnotes”

  1. See for example the situation in Be’eri, paras 212-215 below. ↩

  2. For example in Zikim and Nir Oz. See paras 222 and 216-217 below. ↩

  3. In Nir Oz for example they only arrived at around 14:00. Similarly in Be’eri large forces arrived at around 16:00. See paras 216-217 below. In kibbutz Kfar Aza, external forces arrived sometime after 11:00 and it took them some two days to fully clear militants from the kibbutz. ↩

  4. See more in para 226. ↩

  5. Type Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, known in the Israeli Air Force as Yas’ur. ↩

  6. https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2024-04-11/ty-article-magazine/.premium/0000018e-cd14-df04-adae-edd677210000. ↩

  7. Some information places Givati Shaked forces at the Nova site as early as 10:30 in the morning, reportedly the force travelled from the West Bank once they heard the sirens at 6:30 am with the aim of joining the battle and defending the civilians. ↩

  8. See para 218. ↩

  9. While the Commission has not seen the official directive, according to reports, The Hannibal Directive is the name of a controversial procedure that is used by Israeli Secruity Forces to prevent capture of Israeli Security Forces by enemy forces. ↩

  10. See para 207. ↩

  11. See para 220. ↩

  12. See paras 62-63 and 232. ↩

  13. See paras 228-231. ↩