N. First responders

234. The Commission observed a series of deficiencies in the Israeli examination of the crime scenes and the processing of bodies for identification and burial, including the absence of systematic collection of forensic evidence. The Commission verified through several interviews that all bodies were brought for identificat ion to the Shura camp near Ramleh, where two separate camps were eventually established given the large volume of incoming bodies (Shura A and Shura B). In the days following the attack, criticism began mounting on the slow identification of bodies, with many families being told that their loved ones were ‘missing’. On 11 October, the head of Unit 360 reportedly stated in a media article that the process in Shura included photographing the bodies, taking fingerprints and checking for special identification marks such as tattoos or piercings. Fingerprints are then cross-checked against a database and, once there is a match, the body is released for burial. When there is no match, a DNA sample is taken from the deceased and cross-checked against DNA provided by families of missing persons. He did not mention any collection of forensic material or forensic identification processes. Similarly, testimonies by first responders working in Shura collected by the Commission emphasised a focus on the identification process and religious rites and did not mention forensic evidence collection. One first responder working in Shura camp told the Commission that they spent approximately five to seven minutes on each body, taking photos, checking for identification marks and taking fingerprints.Additionally, according to a report in an Israeli news publication, there was only one CT scanner in the Shura camp. CT scanners are integral for the investigation of the cause of death.

235. The Commission notes that religious volunteer groups, including Unit 360 and ZAKA, were deployed as first responders that day, entering locations immediately after they were cleared by Israeli Security Forces. The Commission observes that these units were not trained or equipped to manage large, complex crime scenes and may have also tainted, or even tampered with, evidence. According to several reports, in the first days following the attack, first responders worked in several locations under fire and were therefore told to hasten the processes of removal of bodies, resulting in no or limited images of the original state of the body taken by a qualified police photographer. In other locations, first responders took photos with their own phones, in some cases covering victims for modesty. One first responder working for ZAKA provided inaccurate and exaggerated accounts of findings in media interviews.