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Hamas Terror on Israel

B. Rocket and mortar attacks into Israel

  1. According to Israeli sources, between 7 October 2023 and 26 May 2024, Hamas armed wing and other armed groups launched over 12,500 rockets and mortar shells into Israel from the Gaza Strip.1 While most rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome system, these attacks resulted in civilian casualties and property damage in Israel. At least 18 civilians were killed in Israel as a result of direct rocket and projectile hits on 7 October and in the weeks that followed. 2 Tens of thousands of civilians from southern Israel, including those near the Gaza border, were evacuated to safer locations.

  2. Hamas military wing and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad publicly claimed responsibility for these attacks. For instance, on 7 October 2023, Mohammed Deif, Head of Hamas military wing al-Qassam Brigades, announced: “the first strike, which targeted enemy positions, airports, and military fortifications, exceeded 5,000 missiles and shells”. While this statement referenced potential military targets, another statement by Palestinian Islamic Jihad spokesman Abu Hamza on the same day highlighted continuing missile attacks by Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters on Israeli communities near the Gaza border.

  3. Additionally, the Commission found several public statements published by Hamas on 7 October 2023, in which they declared that they intentionally fired rockets at civilian targets in Israel. In one such case, the al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility for firing 150 missiles towards Tel Aviv and later published a video of the destruction caused by the rocket attack. Hamas made similar announcements about rockets fired at Ashkelon and Beersheba and published videos showing the damage to residential buildings following the strikes.

  4. The Commission notes that rockets fired by Palestinian armed groups lack precision guidance systems and are inherently inaccurate. Despite advancements in recent years in rocket capabilities, such as increased stockpiling, production, and range expansion up to 250 kilometres, along with the ability to launch larger salvos to overwhelm interception systems like the Iron Dome, their accuracy in distinguishing between military and civilian targets remains limited.3

Sources

Footnotes

Section titled “Footnotes”

  1. https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023 ↩

  2. https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/news/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties#Civilian%20casualties ↩

  3. As noted by the Commission previously in A/78/198 (2023) para 51. ↩